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Abstract. This paper studies the consequences of removing the resampling
assumption from the zero-intelligence trading model in Gode and Sunder
(1993). We obtain three results. First, individual rationality is no longer
sucient to attain allocative eciency in a continuous double auction; hence,
the rules of the market matter. Second, the allocative eciency of the
continuous double auction is higher than for other sequential protocols both
with or without resampling. Third, compared to zero intelligence, the eect
of learning on allocative eciency is sharply positive without resampling
and mildly negative with resampling.
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In a recent paper, Mirowski (2007) argues that we are witnessing a \shift
to a market-centered theory of computational economics" (p. 214). He at-
tributes an important strand in this shift to the ramications of Gode and
Sunder (1993). This seminal paper is widely credited1 with showing that
the continuous double auction can attain allocative eciency and conver-
gence to the equilibrium price in the absence of trader intelligence. Such
zero-intelligence (henceforth, ZI) is modeled by replacing human subjects
with computerized agents that generate random quotes.
As Mirowski himself acknowledges, \there is still substantial dispute over
the interpretation of their results" (p. 216); e.g., see Brewer et al. (2002).
The boldest claim is that an appropriate market institution can override
the cognitive limitations of individuals to achieve allocative eciency and
discover the equilibrium price. On the other side of the fence, the sharpest
criticism is oered by Gjerstad and Shachat (2007). This paper provides
a fresh and careful reading of Gode and Sunder (1993) that makes two
points: rst, convergence to the equilibrium price does not actually occur in
Gode and Sunder (1993); second, the key condition for allocative eciency
is the individual rationality of the agents rather than the market discipline
imposed by the continuous double auction.
Based on this, Gjerstad and Shachat (2007) concludes that \individual
rationality is both necessary and sucient to reach" allocative eciency
(p. 7). This argument is backed up by the claim that Gode and Sunder
(1993) deals with a special case of the B-process for which Hurwicz, Radner
and Reiter (1975) proves that in an economy without externalities a random
but otherwise individually rational behavior converges to a Pareto optimal
allocation.
In fact, this claim rests on a subtle but far from innocuous assumption
made in Gode and Sunder (1993) that has gone largely unnoticed in the
literature. We quote from Gode and Sunder (1993, p. 122): \There are
several variations of the double auction. We made three choices to simplify
our implementation of the double auction. Each bid, ask, and transaction
was valid for a single unit. A transaction canceled any unaccepted bids and
oers. Finally, when a bid and a ask crossed, the transaction price was
equal to the earlier of the two." (Emphasis added.) We call the emphasized
assumption resampling because under zero intelligence it forces all agents
who have already uttered a quote to issue a new (random) one after each
transaction.
This paper studies the consequences of removing the resampling assump-
tion. We obtain three results. First, under zero intelligence, individual ra-
tionality without resampling is not sucient to attain allocative eciency in
1 See Footnote 5 in Gjerstad and Shachat (2007).
1a continuous double auction; hence, the rules of the market matter. On the
other hand, with or without resampling, the allocative eciency of the con-
tinuous double auction is higher than for the other sequential protocols we
consider; hence, this market protocol is still the most eective among those.
Third, when zero intelligence is replaced by a simple variant of the algorithm
mimicking learning-based human behavior proposed in Gjerstad and Dick-
haut (1998), we nd that the eect on allocative eciency is sharply positive
without resampling but tends to be mildly negative with resampling.
2 The model
We use a setup inspired to Gode and Sunder (1993). There is an economy
with a large number (n = 5000) of traders, who can exchange single units
of a generic good. Each agent is initialized to be a seller or a buyer with
equal probability. Each seller i is endowed with one unit of the good for
which he has a private cost ci that is independently drawn from the uniform
distribution on [0;1]. Each buyer j holds no units and has a private valuation
vj for one unit of the good that is independently drawn from the uniform
distribution on [0;1]. By individual rationality, each seller i is willing to sell
his unit at a price p  ci and each buyer j is willing to buy at most one unit
at a price p  vj.
Gode and Sunder (1993) makes the three simplifying assumptions cited
above. We maintain the rst one and restrict all agents to trade at most
one unit. The third assumption selects the continuous double auction as the
market protocol that regulates the interactions between traders. We expand
on this and compare the allocative eciency of four dierent sequential
protocols, including of course the continuous double auction. These four
protocols are: the continuous double auction, a nondiscretionary dealership,
a hybrid of these two, and the trading pit. The rst three are described in
detail in LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2006, 2007).
Briey, in the continuous double auction (henceforth C) traders sequen-
tially place quotes on the selling and buying books. Orders are immediately
executed at the outstanding price if they are marketable; otherwise, they
are recorded on the books with the usual price-time priority and remain
valid until the end of the trading session. In the trading pit (henceforth
T), traders are randomly matched in pairs: each agent in a pair utters a
quote and, if compatible, they transact at a price equal to the average of
their quotes; this transaction price is made known to the market, but its
participants have no access to the oers exchanged within a pair.
In the dealership (henceforth, D) there is a specialist who posts bid and
ask quotes valid only for a unit transaction. Agents arrive sequentially and
can trade only at the dealer's quotes. Right after a transaction is completed,
both dealer's quotes increase (or decrease) by a xed amount k when the
2agent completes a purchase (or a sale); hence, the bid-ask spread  remains
constant. Clearly, completing a trade between a buyer and a seller by going
through the dealer is costly: for instance, if trader i sells one unit to the
dealer that is immediately after resold to buyer j, the dealer pockets a
value of    k. In this respect, the presence of the dealer negatively aects
allocative eciency. On the other hand, because the dealer guarantees a
xed bid-ask spread, it has a stabilizing eect on price dispersion that is
usually benecial.
For a large range of values, the force of these two eects vary in a pre-
dictable manner. Hence, the instantiation of k and  is inuential but not
crucial: we assume k = 0:005 and  = 0:05 throughout the paper. The
choice of the initial dealer's quotes, instead, is more delicate: when these
happen to be far away from the equilibrium price, the eect on allocative
eciency may be relevant because the rst few trades tend to occur on the
same side of the market (until the dealer's quotes get closer to the equi-
librium price). Except for a nal comment in Section 3.3, we mute this
issue and assume that the initial quotes exactly straddle the (theoretical)
equilibrium price. Finally, the hybrid market (henceforth, H) combines the
continuous double auction with the dealership: agents have access to the
dealer's quotes as well as to the oers from the public recorded in the book.
The initialization for H is the same used for D; that is, k = 0:005,  = 0:05
and the initial dealer's quotes straddle the equilibrium price.
Each of these four protocols is organized over a single trading session,
where all agents participate. Their order of arrival is randomly selected.
Whenever a transaction takes place between two agents, their own orders
are removed from the market and the agents become inactive. The dierence
between assuming resampling or not is the following. Under no resampling,
each agent gets only one chance to act: he can trade up to one unit (if he
nds a suitable quote) or, limitedly to C and H, utter his own quote (that
remains valid until the end). The market closes after all agents have had
their chance to act. Under resampling as postulated in Gode and Sunder
(1993), until an agent completes a trade and becomes inactive, the refresh
following a trade may give him a new chance to act. Therefore, the number
of chances for actions is much greater under resampling, and this tends to
increase allocative eciency. To minimize this bias, we assume that under
resampling the market closes when, following a refresh, all the active agents
have issued a quote and no transaction has occurred.
Two more dierences separate the book-based (we call them \literate")
protocols C and H from the \illiterate"2 protocols D and T. First, the book in
C and H oers to the current agent an option to store his quote, extending his
opportunity to trade in the future; on the contrary, D and T limit his options
to immediate trade or no trade at all. Second, the book makes quotes from
2 This terminology is non-standard, but less convoluted than a plain \non-book-based".
3past traders available to the current agent, presenting him with a larger set
of potential counterparts for his trade; on the other hand hand, for illiterate
protocols the only available counterpart is the dealer in D and a single
partner in T. In other words, a literate protocol expands the opportunities
for trades as well as the pool of potential counterparts. These dierences
are not a crucial issue under resampling, because a trader returning to the
market faces a new opportunity to trade, usually at dierent conditions.
However, as we discuss below, they have a substantial eect when resampling
is not allowed.
We use two dierent behavioral assumptions in our tests. Under zero
intelligence, when an agent i must issue a quote, he picks a random num-
ber from the uniform distribution on [0;vi] if he is a buyer and from the
uniform distribution on [ci;1] if he is a seller. This behavior corresponds to
zero intelligence under individual rationality and is called ZI-C in Gode and
Sunder (1993). The second behavioral assumption is a simplied version3 of
the learning model introduced in Gjerstad and Dickhaut (1998), where each
trader transforms the empirical acceptance frequencies to generate beliefs
and then issue the quote that maximizes his expected surplus with respect
to these beliefs. This approach is in general quite sensitive to ne details in
its initialization and implementation. However, it can be calibrated to eec-
tively mimic the basic features of human behavior in experimental trading
markets. See Gjerstad (2007) for more details and an improved version of
the original (1998) model.
Our implementation is the following. We discretize the unit interval
[0;1] for prices by assuming a \tick" equal to 1=200 = 0:005. Let Ht(x) =
#(p  x) denote the empirical cumulative frequency of past transaction
prices at time t. Each buyer i starts up with a uniform \prior" described
by the cumulative distribution Fi(x) = minf(x   bvi)+;1g on the ticked
prices contained in the interval [bvi;vi], where b = 0:8. (For a seller i,
we assume by symmetry a uniform distribution over the interval [ci;(1  
b) + bci].) This initial distribution is associated to a coecient ai that
denes the stubborness of i's initial beliefs; we assume that ai is an integer
drawn (once for each agent) from the uniform distribution on f1;2;:::;100g.
When a buyer i is called up for trading at time t, he combines his \prior"
with the empirical distribution Ht(p) and derives a \posterior" cumulative
distribution P(p  x) that is proportional to aiFi(x)+Ht(x). Then buyer i
issues a bid b that maximizes his expected utility (v b)P(p  b). (Sellers'
behavior is analogous.)
3 The most notable dierence is that we do not assume bounded recall of past trans-
actions.
43 Results
We are interested in the allocative eciency of dierent market protocols
under zero intelligence. As usual, allocative eciency is dened as the ratio
between the realized gains from the trade and the maximum feasible gains
from trade. This measure is adimensional, facilitating comparisons. We
compare the allocative eciency of the four protocols described above under
both zero intelligence and our version of the learning model proposed in
Gjerstad and Dickhaut (1998). Since we view the role of the dealer as a
mere feature of the protocol, his nal gains/losses are not included in the
computation of the allocative eciency.
3.1 Test 1: does resampling matter?
Assume zero-intelligence trading. The left-hand side of Figure 1 shows as
datapoints the allocative eciency of the continuous double auction with
resampling for 100 dierent runs. The right-hand side shows the same in-
formation for the continuous double auction without resampling. The y-axes
use the same scale, so that it is possible to directly compare the results under
the two assumptions by visual inspection: the higher the level, the higher
the allocative eciency.
l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l


































l l l l l l
l l
l





















l l l l l l l l l l






























Figure 1: Allocative eciency for C with (left) and without resampling
(right).
The average allocative eciency is 0.96 with resampling and 0.52 with-
out resampling. Visual inspection strongly suggests that the distribution of
the allocative eciency with resampling stochastically dominates the distri-
bution without resampling. More modestly, we claim that under resampling
the expected value of allocative eciency is higher. This is supported for
any practical level of condence by the directional version of the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test. (Here and in the following, by a practical level of con-
dence we mean a p-value lower than 10 5.) Limited to our experiment,
5therefore, we conclude that ceteris paribus resampling yields a higher al-
locative eciency than no resampling. In short, resampling truly matters a
lot.
3.2 Test 2: which protocol performs better under zero intel-
ligence?
Our second test extends the rst one by looking at the eects of resampling
under zero intelligence for other sequential protocols. Each protocol is iden-
tied by its initials on the x-axis and by a dierent color: the continuous
double auction (C) is in black; the nondiscretionary dealership (D) is in red;
the hybridization (H) of the continuous double auction with a dealership is
in green; and the trading pit (T) is in blue. The left-hand side of Figure 2
reports for each protocol the allocative eciency with resampling for 100
dierent runs, as well as the sample average at the bottom of each column.
The right-hand side shows the same information for the continuous double
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0.52 0.33 0.42 0.077
Figure 2: Allocative eciency with (left) and without resampling (right).
We make two claims. The rst one is that, for each protocol, allocative
eciency with resampling is signicantly much higher than without resam-
pling. This conrms and reinforces our earlier claim that the assumption
of resampling matters a lot. The data in black concerning the continuous
double auction (C) are reproduced from Figure 1 and need no further com-
mentary. The data in red regarding the dealership (D) report a sample
average of 0.91 with resampling against 0.33 with no resampling. Analo-
gously, the data in green regarding the hybrid protocol (H) give a sample
average of 0.94 with resampling against 0.42 with no resampling. Finally,
the sample averages for the trading pit (T) is 0.78 with resampling and
0.077 with no resampling. For each protocol, the directional version of the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test supports the signicance of the dierence with
6and without resampling for any practical level of condence.
We conclude that the introduction of the resampling assumption has
a dramatic positive eect on allocative eciency under zero intelligence.
Hence, this assumption introduces an important bias that undermines Gode
and Sunder's (1998) claim that \the primary cause of the high allocative
eciency of double auctions is the market discipline imposed on traders"
(p. 134), unless such market discipline is not taken to include resampling as
well.
Two minor observations are worth making. First, regardless of the re-
sampling assumptions, allocative eciency is higher for literate protocols.
The reason is that they give each trader access to a larger pool of counter-
parts. Second, the dierences in the allocative eciency of the trading pit
are exaggerated by the minor modeling assumption that traders are matched
in pairs. This implies that several pairs end up being formed by traders on
the same side of the market who are bound not to trade. Therefore, we have
also tested the alternative assumption that buyers and sellers are matched
in pairs, making sure that each pair is formed by agents on the opposite
side of the market. In this second case, the sample average of the allocative
eciency without resampling is 0.15. No qualitative conclusion is aected,
although it is obvious that the trading pit works much better if traders can
be screened in buyers versus sellers before being matched. (For each of the
other protocols, the adirectional version of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test
supports at any practical level of condence the claim that it is makes no
dierence for allocative eciency to have buyers and sellers arrive in random
order or alternately.)
Our second claim is that the allocative eciency of the continuous dou-
ble auction with or without resampling is higher than for other sequential
protocols; hence, this market protocol remains more eective under zero in-
telligence. This is easily detectable by visual inspection of the two tables
in Figure 2. The directional version of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test sup-
ports the claim that C yields a higher expected allocative eciency than H
(the highest competitor) for any practical level of condence, both in the
case of resampling (left) and no resampling (right). This conrms Gode and
Sunder's (1993) intuition that the continuous double auction provides an
important and natural benchmark for allocative eciency under zero intelli-
gence. The next test inquires whether this remains true under more realistic
assumptions about agents' behavior.
3.3 Test 3: does learning make a dierence?
Our third test extends the previous one by looking at the allocative e-
ciency of protocols under the alternative assumption that traders learn and
optimize according to a slightly simplied version of the model in Gjerstad
and Dickhaut (1998). We consider rst the case without resampling, and
7then the case with resampling.
The right-hand side of Figure 3 shows for each protocol the allocative
eciency without resampling for 100 dierent runs as well as the sample
average, under the assumption that all agents base their trading on our
simple model of learning and optimization. The left-hand side shows the
same information (copied from Figure 2) under zero-intelligence trading for
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0.94 0.72 0.98 0.24
Figure 3: Allocative eciency under heuristic learning without resampling.
Direct inspection shows that, without resampling, learning greatly im-
proves the expected value of the allocative eciency for each protocol. The
sample average shoots from 0.52 to 0.94 for C, from 0.33 to 0.72 for D, from
0.42 to 0.98 for H, and from 0.077 to 0.24 for T. (The directional Wilcoxon
test supports this hypothesis for any practical level of condence.) This
eect is easily explained. Under zero intelligence, resampling implies a com-
plete refresh after each trade, in the sense that (conditional on the set of
active traders) the probability distribution of the next quote is independent
of the past. This makes the prices of the rst few transactions almost ir-
relevant for predicting future behavior. On the other hand, under learning,
the prices of past transactions aect the beliefs and hence the actions of
future traders. The initial transaction prices feed future beliefs, amplifying
the eect.
Even tough the lack of resampling forbids agents from revising their past
quotes, the learning process substitutes for this because incoming agents use
past history when formulating their quotes. Therefore, under no resampling,
learning makes a huge dierence for the allocative eciency of a market
protocol. To the extent that learning is a behavioral assumption while no
resampling is an institutional feature, this strongly suggests that we cannot
apply the claim that \the primary cause of the high allocative eciency
of double auctions is the market discipline imposed on traders" (Gode and
Sunder, 1993, p. 134) to situations in which resampling does not hold.
A comparison of the left- and right-hand sides of Figure 3 shows two more
8eects. First, regardless of the behavioral assumptions, allocative eciency
is as usual higher for literate protocols. Second, learning-based behavior
tends to increase the dispersion of allocative eciency. The sample standard
deviation goes from 0.013 to 0.081 for C, from 0.011 to 0.046 for D, from
0.011 to 0.010 for H, and from 0.008 to 0.016 for T. There is a sharp increase
for three protocols and a mild decrease for one. This is another manifestation
of the path-dependency implicit in our learning process: when a few initial
trades o the equilibrium price point beliefs in the wrong direction, behavior
may cluster around the wrong price and reduce allocative eciency. This
tends to increase the variability in performance, although the overall eect
remains clearly favorable.
We now move to consider resampling. Figure 4 reports the same infor-
mation as Figure 3 under the assumption of resampling. The left-hand side
assumes zero intelligence; the right-hand side is based on our learning-based
behavioral assumption. The usual coding applies. Once again, regardless of
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0.91 0.88 0.95 0.78
Figure 4: Allocative eciency under heuristic learning with resampling.
Under resampling, learning degrades the expected allocative eciency
for three protocols. The sample average falls from 0.96 to 0.91 for C, from
0.91 to 0.88 for D, and from 0.7845 to 0.7838 for T, while it increases from
0.94 to 0.95 for H. (For C, D, and T, the directional Wilcoxon test supports
the claim for any practical level of condence; for H, the condence level
is 0:0007.) The sample standard deviation goes from 0.003 to 0.074 for C,
from 0.002 to 0.017 for D, from 0.0019 to 0.006 for H, and from 0.024 to
0.139 for T.
Compared to the sharp improvement it carries without resampling, learn-
ing tends to have an opposite eect and bring about a reduction on allocative
eciency under resampling. Given the extremely high values of allocative
eciency under zero intelligence, this is not surprising. There is very little
room to improve on allocative eciency, so the rare occasions when path-
9dependent beliefs xate on the wrong price end up reducing the allocative
eciency and increasing its dispersion. This is however not true for the hy-
brid protocol, because it can exploit the traders' book to reduce the amount
of allocative eciency lost to the dealer as well as the presence of the dealer
herself to reduce the chance of transaction prices xating on the wrong price.
The eects of path-dependent learning can also be apprised by compar-
ing the time series of the transaction prices. The left-hand (respectively,
right-hand) side of Figure 5 shows two representative series for the con-
tinuous double auction with (without) resampling: zero intelligence is in
red, learning-based behavior is in black. The x-axis reports the numbers of
transactions: the longer the series, the higher the volume.


















































Figure 5: Series of transaction prices for C with (left) and without resam-
pling (right).
Zero intelligence exhibits comparatively wilder oscillations that eventu-
ally tend to fade out, but are centered around the correct equilibrium price.
Moreover, as obvious, the volume generated with resampling is much higher
than without resampling. Finally, it is apparent that lack of resampling
sharply reduces the overall dispersion of transaction prices. A careful look
at the right-end tail of the series on the left shows that the dispersion with
resampling becomes comparable to that one without resampling precisely
when trading in the latter approaches its end.
Learning-based behavior generates much tighter series around some price.
Allocative eciency is hurt in those relatively unfrequent cases where this
is dierent from (on the left of Figure 5, lower than) the equilibrium price.
Independently of the assumptions about resampling, whenever beliefs x-
ate around the \wrong" price, the volume of transactions goes down and
this hurts allocative eciency. But there are two crucial dierences. First,
without resampling, traders cannot re-enter the market after having issued
a quote: as wrong beliefs aect less people, the eect is reduced. Second,
and limitedly to the two illiterate protocols (D and T), volume without re-
10p = 0:5 p = 0:03
zero intelligence learning zero intelligence learning
D H D H D H D H
no resampling 0.33 0.42 0.72 0.98 0.37 0.49 0.10 0.23
with resampling 0.91 0.94 0.88 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.13 0.26
Table 1: The impact of the dealer's initial quotes on allocative eciency.
sampling is heavily impaired by the combination of potentially wrong beliefs
with uniqueness of the opportunity to trade and of the potential counter-
part. As a result, given learning based-behavior, giving up resampling has a
moderate positive eect for allocative eciency in the two literate protocols
C and H and a large negative eect for the illiterate protocols D and T.
A related issue is the robustness of our learning-based model for proto-
cols involving a dealer in extreme situations, such as when the initial dealer's
quote are very far from the equilibrium price. For instance, Table 1 sum-
marizes the sample averages of allocative eciency for D and H with and
without resampling as well as under zero intelligence or learning-based be-
havior under two dierent initializations. On the left we report the case
where the initial dealer's quotes straddle the equilibrium price p = 0:5, as
assumed throughout this paper. On the right, we report the case where the
initial dealer's quotes straddle p = 0:03. It is clear that the quantitative
eects of extreme initializations for D and H may be substantial.
To sum it up, compared to zero-intelligence, learning-based behavior
brings about two eects on the allocative eciency of a protocol. The neg-
ative one is the occasional clustering of path-dependent beliefs around the
wrong price. This reduces allocative eciency. The positive eect is that
beliefs xating around the equilibrium price help future traders to avoid
wrong quotes. This improves allocative eciency. Without resampling, the
positive eect swamps the negative one for all protocols. Under resam-
pling, the negative eect tends to prevail. (An additional eect related to
the literacy of a protocol emerges when comparing allocative eciency un-
der learning-based behavior with and without resampling.) While this is
not the place for sweeping generalizations, it seems legitimate to conjecture
that the performance of a protocol under zero intelligence with resampling is
not a good proxy for its performance under learning-based human behavior
without resampling.
4 Conclusions
Our rst result is that, under zero intelligence, individual rationality without
resampling is not sucient to attain allocative eciency in the continuous
double auction. Stronger than that, it is not sucient in none of the four
market protocols we study: none of the simulations reported on the left
11achieves more than 60% of the maximum allocative eciency. This estab-
lishes that the rules of the market matter: when resampling is ruled out,
zero intelligence rules out allocative eciency. The \second" assumption
in Gode and Sunder (1993) is not a mere simplication, but an important
restriction.
Moreover, as shown in Section 3.2, assuming resampling on top of zero
intelligence leads to a sharp increase in allocative eciency for any of the four
dierent protocols we tested. Therefore, the assumption of no resampling
introduces a substantial bias towards achieving allocative eciency. Gode
and Sunder's (1998) claim that \the primary cause of the high allocative
eciency of double auctions is the market discipline imposed on traders"
(p. 134) does not hold when their unconspicuous assumption of resampling
is dropped.
On the other hand, we also nd that the allocative eciency of the
continuous double auction under zero intelligence is never lower than for
the other three market protocols. This validates Gode and Sunder's (1993)
intuition about the eectiveness of the continuous double auction. In some
cases, there may be other market protocols that exhibit similar results in this
respect. This suggests the importance of introducing additional performance
measures to rank market protocols that exhibit a similar degree of allocative
eciency, as discussed in LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2007a).
Our nal result concerns the performance of the four market protocols
when zero intelligence is replaced by a simple version of the learning-based
model of human behavior proposed in Gierstad and Dickhaut (1998). We
nd that learning-based behavior has two opposite eects on allocative ef-
ciency. When path-dependent beliefs end up clustering around the wrong
price, allocative eciency is reduced. When instead they xate around the
equilibrium price allocative eciency improves. The sign for the combina-
tion of these two eects is a priori ambiguous. We nd that it is sharply
positive without resampling and (usually) mildly negative with resampling.
Since human behavior is very likely to have more in common with learning
than with zero intelligence, this implies that the ability of a protocol to
steer human traders towards allocative eciency is not independent of the
assumptions about resampling.
References
[1] Brewer PJ, Huang M, Nelson B, Plott CR (2002) On the behavioral
foundations of the law of supply and demand: Human convergence and
robot randomness. Experimental Economics 5:179-208
[2] Gjerstad S (2007), The competitive market paradox. Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics and Control 31:1753{1780
12[3] Gjerstad S, Dickhaut J (1998), Price formation in double auctions.
Games and Economic Behavior 22: 1{29
[4] Gjerstad S, Shachat JM (2007), Individual rationality and market e-
ciency, wp 1204, August. IRBEMS, Krannert School, Purdue University
[5] Gode DK, Sunder S (1993), Allocative eciency of markets with zero
intelligence traders: Market as a partial substitute for individual ratio-
nality. Journal of Political Economy 101:119{137.
[6] Hurwicz L, Radner R, Reiter S (1975), A stochastic decentralized re-
source allocation process: Part I. Econometrica 43:187{222.
[7] LiCalzi M, Pellizzari P (2006), The allocative eectiveness of market
protocols under intelligent trading. In: Bruun C (ed) Advances in Ar-
ticial Economics, 17{29. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New York
[8] LiCalzi M, Pellizzari P (2007), Simple market protocols for ecient risk
sharing. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31:3568{3590
[9] LiCalzi M, Pellizzari P (2007a), Which market protocols facilitate fair
trading? In: Consiglio A (ed) Articial Markets Modeling, 81{97,
Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New York
[10] Mirowski P (2007), Markets come to bits: Evolution, computation and
markomata in economic science. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 63:209{242
13